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Abstract: The purpose of this article is to investigate whether the securities 
regulation put forward by the EU contributes to an efficient stock market. An event 
study of investor meetings/presentations held by listed Danish firms is conducted. 
The article finds significantly positive abnormal returns a few days around  
investor meetings. Share turnover reaches maximum one day after investor 
meetings. The variances of the abnormal returns  increase substantially the closer 
we get to the holding of an investor meeting, indicating the presence of possible 
insider trading. The relevant securities regulation based on EU directives is 
critically discussed and thus compared with US regulation. 
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1.  Introduction 
Investor meetings or presentations held by European listed firms have increased 
in popularity recent years. This is also the case in Denmark, where several firms 
have put down specific bodies to handle investor relations activities, which 
include arrangement of various investor meetings/presentations. One of the 
reasons for holding these meetings for actual and potential investors, is that they 
enable market participants to obtain more information about the activities and 
strategies of listed firms in order to make more accurate earnings forecasts. 
However, this development also raises some important legal aspects concerning 
both listed firms’ disclosure obligations and securities regulation in general.  
This article analyzes whether the EU securities regulation of insider trading and 
the general duty of listed companies to disclose price relevant information is 
sufficient regarding the arrangement of investor meetings/presentations. The 
question therefore relates to whether the regulation enhances the efficiency of the 
stock markets in EU member states. Thus, the article makes a contribution to the 
debate over the legal protection of investors which is a major issue in the debate 
of corporate governance. The article conducts an event study using both  
parametric/nonparametric to measure the impact on share prices of investor 
meetings. The article also makes use of a test for homogeneity of variances, in 
order to measure the extent of insider trading. The sample consists of 120 
investor meetings of Danish companies held within the last five years 
An incentive for management to arrange investor meetings is that management 
may regard the company’s shares as “undervalued” and therefore seeks to “speak 
the price up”. This can be accomplished by providing information about changes 
in the company’s future business strategy or inform more or less specifically 
about projects that market participants have not yet been informed about. For 
instance, at the investor presentation held by Tele Danmark on September 8 
2000, Henning Dyremose CEO argued that the motivation for holding the investor 
meeting was that the management in Tele Danmark regarded the share price as 
“highly undervalued”. Other firms report that they frequently arrange investor 
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meetings in order to enhance the liquidity of the company’s shares. The article 
tests the following hypotheses: 
 
1st Hypothesis: During an investor meeting management provides inside 
information which enables investors to earn an abnormal  return 
 
2nd Hypothesis: There is trading based on insider information even prior to the 
investor meeting enabling some investors to earn abnormal returns.  
 
During an investor meeting, management could easily violate the obligations 
codified in the securities regulation. The relevant securities legislation concerns 
the prohibition against insider trading and the general duty to disclose. If 
management informs participants of a meeting about certain conditions that may 
influence share prices and does not simultaneously inform the stock market, 
management contravenes the prohibition against insider trading. This is also the 
case for investors who trade on the basis of such inside information. In addition, 
management would in this situation violate the general duty to disclose relevant 
information. This is because management has an obligation to inform the stock 
market immediately, if it possesses information that could influence the share 
prices. It is not enough just to inform the participants at the meeting or wait to 
inform investors about relevant information when the investor meeting is actually 
taking place. In this light the Copenhagen Stock Exchange just recently made an 
announcement where it recommended that firms should pay more attention to 
their disclosure obligations when arranging such investor meetings.  
The Danish securities regulation is based on EU-directives which have been 
incorporated into Danish law. Even though EU prohibits insider trading and has 
codified a general doctrine for management to disclose relevant information, there 
are no specific rules governing listed firms’ arrangement of investor meetings. 
Instead it is up to EU member states to formulate their own rules concerning 
investor meetings, but no EU state has yet adopted rules that deals solely with 
investor meetings. 
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Generally, the financial literature concerning insider trading seems to regard 
insider trading as non-desirable. Proponents of insider trading argue that insider 
trading fosters efficient capital markets by improving the accuracy of stock prices. 
Insider trading promotes quick price discovery which mitigates the incentive for 
many individuals to collect the same information (see Manne (1966), and Carlton 
and Fichel (1983), and Leland (1992)). On the other hand opponents argue that 
insider trading inevitably implies that there is a loser for each winner, since 
informed traders’ abnormal returns reduce the opposing traders’ realized returns. 
Secondly, insider trading increases the bid-ask spread by the market maker, 
created by an adverse selection mechanism. If the market-maker is unable to 
distinguish between types of traders, then he would be forced to charge all 
traders for the expected value of their possible non-public information (see e.g. 
Seyhun 1985). This increases the bid-ask spread which therefore reduces the 
efficiency of the stock market.  
Narayanan (2000) formulates a model of the voluntary disclosure of information 
by firms. He shows that the likelihood and amount of voluntary disclosure 
increases with manager’s pay sensitivity, firm quality, and the number of insiders 
privy to the information and decreases with market liquidity. Furthermore he 
shows that stringent enforcement of insider trading regulations induces more 
disclosure by firms whereas the short sales prohibition on insiders induce less 
disclosure. 
According to Fama’s (1970) classical definition of the Efficient Markets 
Hypothesis, a market in which prices always “fully reflect” available information 
is called efficient. Weak form of efficiency means that the information set includes 
only the history of prices (or returns) whereas semistrong-form of efficiency in 
addition requires that the information set includes all publicly available 
information. When all information is known to each market participant, including 
private/inside information, the market is said to be efficient in the strong form. If 
insiders are not able to earn abnormal returns, this would indicate that markets 
are strong form efficient. If there are no abnormal returns associated with 
investor meetings, this would indicate that prices already reflect all information 
disclosed at the meeting.  
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We can not reject the 1st hypothesis, since there is a short-term effect four days 
after an investor meeting, although there is no significant effect in the long run. 
The results show that there are significantly positive abnormal returns around  
investor meetings. The variances of the abnormal returns are much higher the 
closer we get to the investor meetings, suggesting that we can not reject the 2nd 
hypothesis. Share price turnover reaches maximum the day after the holding of 
investor meetings. This feature therefore supports the other findings. The results 
indicate that the current EU-regulation does not contribute enough to achieving 
an efficient and well functioning stock market.  
The article is organized as follows. Literature  is presented in section 2. Section 3 
gives a brief description of the relevant legislation in the United States, EU and  
Denmark. Data is described in section 4 and the methodology is outlined in 
section 5. The results are presented in section 6 followed by a robustness test in 
section 7. The results are discussed in section 8 and the article concludes in 
section 9. 
 
2. Literature 
There seems to be no event studies in the financial literature concerning the 
impact of investor meetings/presentations on share prices. However, several 
studies investigate whether corporate insiders are able to earn abnormal returns 
due to their private information. Yermack (1997) finds in a sample of 620 stock 
options-awards coincides with movements in firms stock prices. Patterns that of 
companies’ quarterly earnings announcements are consistent with an 
interpretation that CEOs receive stock option awards shortly before favorable 
corporate news. Ferreira (1995) shows that corporate insiders earn abnormal 
returns by adjusting their own firms’ stock trading to future market movements.  
Meulbroek (1992) conducts an empirical analysis of illegal insider trading 
focusing on how informed trading affects stock prices. She finds that insider 
trading is associated with immediate price movements. The cumulative abnormal 
return on inside trading days is half as large as the price reaction to the public 
revelation of the information on which the insider trades.  
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According to Meulbroek this ratio suggests that the stock market detects 
informed trading and impounds a large proportion of the information into the 
stock price before it becomes public. Syed et al. examines if trading on stocks 
based on the inside information about the “Heard on the Street” column of the 
Wall Street Journal generates abnormal returns. The authors finds significant 
abnormal returns on days t=-1 and t=0 (publications date) for the stocks related 
to insider trading. For a comparable control group of non-insider-traded 
abnormal returns were not significant on day t=-1. The results indicate that the 
inside information was the cause for the differences. 
 
3.  Securities Regulation and  Investor Meetings 
The purpose of holding investor meetings is to increase market participants’ 
interest in the company’s shares by providing information that in some way or 
another will influence the valuation of a company’s shares. In this situation 
management is inevitable caught in a dilemma since it has to act in the best 
interests of the existing shareholders (i.e. maximizing the net present value of the 
existing shares) but on the other hand, if management did not provide any 
relevant information, no one would ever show up to an investor meeting. Thus, 
when holding investor meetings, management has to be aware of the provisions 
codified in the securities regulation, since information provided by management 
could easily constitute a violation of the prohibitions against insider trading and 
the general duty to disclose. 
3.1 EU Securities regulation and investor meetings 
The insider Directive 89/592/EEC was finally adopted on 13 November 1989. It 
requires implementation by 1 June 1992 and is now passed by all member states 
in EU (see Edwards 1999 p. 308). The history of the Directive goes back to 1966 
with the publication of a report entitled The Development of a European Capital 
Market. The Committee of experts recommended rules “to prevent those who 
virtue of their office in a company, have access to information which might 
influence the market from using their knowledge to secure a personal advantage 
denied to other investors” (quoted by Edwards 1999 p.309).  
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The Insider Directive was formulated as a minimum Directive in order to promote 
an internal market for goods and services. The aim of the Directive is stated in 
the preamble which states that the purpose is to ensure confidence for an 
effective and functioning capital market by treating all investors equally. As 
opposed to the US securities regulation, “inside information” is defined. In Art 
1(1) inside information is as; 
Information which has not been made public of a precise nature relation to one or 
several issuers of transferable securities or to one or several transferable securities, 
which, if it were made public, would be likely to have a significant effect on the 
price of the transferable security or securities in question… 
 
The Directive does not directly deal with the situation of investor meetings but 
distinguishes between different types of insiders. Primary insiders are defined in 
Art 2(1) as persons who have direct access to inside information as employees, 
consultants or shareholders. Secondary insiders in Art 4 are persons who receive 
inside information from one of the persons mentioned above and it is sufficient to 
violate the prohibition that the information stems from a primary insider. Since 
the Directive is a minimum Directive, member states may adopt more stringent 
provisions c.f. art. 6. Articles 8-10 deal with the enforcement and art. 13 
prescribes that member states shall determine penalties. The EU-Directive was a 
major innovation for all EU member states, except for the United Kingdom, which 
already had a detailed law on insider dealing. The British legislation is based on 
the view that the motivation for the prohibition of insider trading is the misuse of 
information obtained when the insider is in a position of trust above all in 
relation to the company in question, i.e. use of information is a breach of 
fiduciary duties by a “connected” person (see Elland and Bently (1991)). Thus, no 
European Stock exchange/authority has issued specific rules dealing solely with 
investor meetings/presentations.  
EU has initiated several Directives concerning firms’ obligations to disclose 
various kind of information that influences the valuation of firms, e.g. the 
development of common accounting standards in the forth Directive and seventh 
Directive.  
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The first EU-Directive of securities regulation 79/279/EEC formulates some 
minimum requirements a firm has to oblige when listed at a stock exchange, c.f. 
section A-D. The Directive states that listed firms are obliged to publish new 
information, as soon as possible, that substantially could influence the valuation 
of share prices. The purpose is to enhance the efficiency of the European stock 
exchanges and give investors equal treatment. The general duty to disclose 
relevant information to all market participants is inspired of the equal 
opportunity doctrine in Common Law. Furthermore, it reduces the period of time 
when there is a risk that investors trade on inside information.  
 
 
3.2  Danish securities regulation and investor meetings 
The provisions of the EU-Directive have been incorporated into Danish law. The 
Danish Securities Act (section 34 and 35) contains prohibitions against trading 
on inside information and delivering inside information. The Danish regulation is 
similar to the Insider Directive except that the Danish Securities Act does not 
distinguish between primary and secondary insiders. The general duty to disclose 
relevant information is codified in the Danish Securities Act section 27. See 
Krüger Andersen and Clausen (2000) for a detailed description of the Danish 
Securities regulation.  
In addition, Copenhagen Stock Exchange is authorized to issue supplementary 
rules. It requires that information provided by management e.g. in connection 
with investor meetings must only take place if the information simultaneously is 
made public for all market participants. This follows from Section 8(2) in the 
rules issued by Copenhagen Stock Exchange, although there does not exist any 
incident where management has been sanctioned due to a violation of the above 
rule (section 8(2)). Copenhagen Stock Exchange has in some circumstances taken 
a more pragmatic view and recognized that persons involved with a firm’s 
financial restructuring may get inside information. This is only permitted if the 
persons involved do not violate their professional duty of confidentiality, refrain 
from trading the firm’s shares within the period of time and provided that the 
information afterwards is made public.  
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Danish law only requires that firms must have internal rules concerning 
management’s and employee’s handling of inside information. But the law does 
not prescribe the content of those rules, it is solely up to the individual firm to 
specify the content. 
 
3.3  US Securities regulation and investor meetings 
Even though the draft of the EU insider-Directive goes back several years, the 
United States passed two federal securities laws just after the great depression in 
1929, c.f. Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The aim 
was to protect shareholders through a doctrine of equal treatment of investors. 
This  implies that all shareholders must have simultaneous access to relevant 
information regarding share prices. At the same time the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) was established with the authorization to issue 
binding federal rules. The prohibition of insider trading in the US is now governed 
by a detailed legislation although the term insider trading has not been defined 
by the SEC. The US legislation of insider trading is based on a detailed collection 
of provisions as well as a substantial amount of case law,  which for example has 
contributed to clarify the so-called misappropriation theory. The misappropriation 
theory (see e.g. Dirks v. SEC) states that in the judgement of whether a certain 
trade violates the insider trading prohibition codified in Rule 10b-5, emphasis 
should be placed on whether there has been an unlawful appropriation of 
internal information or whether the culprit has obtained an enrichment due to 
the use of inside information.  
Just recently SEC has adopted new rules that address the selective disclosure of 
nonpublic information by issuer in Rule 100 of Regulation FD c.f. SEC’s final 
rule: “Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading” (August 15 2000. Effective date: 
23 October File No.S7-31-99). The regulation requires that when an issuer, or 
person acting on its behalf, discloses nonpublic information to certain 
enumerated persons (in general, securities market professionals and holders of 
the issuers securities who may as well trade on the basis of the information), it 
must make public disclosure of that information.  
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Concerning the timing of the disclosure, it depends on whether the selective 
disclosure was intentional or non-intentional: In the first case an issuer must 
make public disclosure simultaneously and in the latter case the issuer must 
make public disclosure promptly e.g. by filing a Form 8-k. SEC argues that the 
motivation for the rules is that “many issuers are disclosing important nonpublic 
information, such as advance warnings of earnings results to securities analysts 
or selected institutional investors, before making full disclosure of the same 
information to the general public. Where this has happened, those who were privy 
to the information beforehand were able to make a profit or avoid a loss at the 
expense of those kept in the dark” (c.f. page 2). SEC also proposes alternative 
ways for public disclosures, including Internet webcasting, by telephonic means 
or by announcing the conference content just before an investor meeting.  
In summary, we can say that the US regulation on this vital area is considerably 
more detailed and elaborated compared to the EU. But probably most important 
of all, US regulators are much more aware of the problems associated with 
investor meetings/presentations and firms disclosure obligations in general than 
their European counterparts.  
 
4. Data 
This article defines an investor meeting as a publicly announced arrangement 
held by a firm in which some analysts and professional investors are invited. At 
the meeting, senior company officers give information about the firm that is 
regarded relevant for outsiders’ valuation of the company’s shares. Sometimes 
large firms hold so-called closed investor meetings where only a few large 
investors or analysts who specialize in this particular branch are invited. 
However, information about the frequency and the extent of these closed investor 
meetings is extremely difficult to obtain for an outsider. It is therefore also almost 
impossible to conduct a valid empirical investigation of the phenomenon. 
Data consists of an unique sample of Danish listed companies’ arrangements of 
investor meetings/presentations over the last 5 years. Information about the 
investor meetings is obtained both from the companies own homepages on the 
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internet, as well as annual reports from the Danish Society of Financial Analysts 
(Den Danske Finansanalytikerforening) in which information about investor 
meetings initiated by this body is available. Large companies normally arrange 
investor meetings by themselves, whereas medium size companies very often hold 
investor meetings through the Danish Society of Financial Analysts.  
Companies occasionally invite investors a few days after the annual accounts are 
made public, in order to elaborate the annual accounts and answer questions 
posed by investors. Those meetings are excluded from the sample since the 
information content of them may be biased.  None of the investor meetings in the 
sample concerns a situation where a firm is in a situation of financial distress or 
is being restructured.  This leaves a sample consisting of 120 events or investor 
meetings. In no cases management informed Copenhagen Stock Exchange about 
the information content of the investor meetings.  
 
 
DSAF: Danish Society of Financial Analysts, *Only up to the last quarter of 2000. 
 
Figure 1 shows the frequency of investor meetings during the period. The number 
of investor meetings has increased within the last years as well as the fraction of 
companies which arrange investor meetings by themselves. DSFA stands for the 
Danish Society of Financial Analysts. Share prices of daily data are obtained from 
the database BORSDATA located at the Aarhus School of Business. 
Figur 1. Investor m eetings/presentations arranged by 
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5.  Methodology 
To measure the effect of an economic event on the value of a firm economists 
have frequently used event-study analysis which is especially suited for 
examining the information content of disclosures. Event study analysis has also 
been employed frequently in various investigations of insider trading (see e.g. 
Jaffe (1974) for an early use of event study analysis concerning insider trading). 
 
 5.1 Parametric tests 
If investor meetings convey relevant information to investors one should expect to 
see that the actual return deviates from the predicted return, where the predicted 
return represents the return that would be expected if no event took place (see 
Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay for a detailed description of event-study analysis). 
The article calculates the predicted return using the market model in the form  
 
Ri,t = α i + β iR m,t + ε i,t                                    (1) 
 
where Ri,t  is the daily return on the stock of firm i on day t  and R m,t is the return 
on day t for the total market index on Copenhagen Stock Exchange. The 
parameters α i and β i for firm i in the market model are estimated by OLS using 
daily data from the estimation period running from –260 to –13 days prior to the 
event day. The error term ε i,t is expected to satisfy the standard assumptions 
except that the model has been transformed to the generalized difference 
equation if the Durbin-Watson d- statistic showed first order serial-correlation 
where the coefficient of serial-correlation was estimated from the OLS residuals.  
Abnormal returns are calculated for each firm and for each day in the event 
period running from –12 to +12 days after an investor meeting has been held. 
Abnormal returns for firm i on day t are obtained as: 
 
 ARi,t = Ri,t  - (α i + β iR m,t )                                                                       (2) 
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In order to draw overall inferences about investor meetings, the abnormal return 
observations must be aggregated. The cumulative abnormal return CARi(τ1 ,τ2) for 
stock i from time τ1 to τ2 is now given as followed: 
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Inference and tests for significance of the abnormal returns over the period τ1 to 
τ2 are based on the following asymptotic normally distributed test statistic (see 
also Brown and Warner 1980) 
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T1 equals the first day in the estimation period, T2 respectively the last day. Li 
denotes the length of the event period i.e. Li = τ2  + τ1 +1. E(Rm) denotes the 
average market return in the estimation period where as E(Rm,Li) denotes the 
average market return in the event period. 2ˆ iσ  is equal to the squared residuals  
in the estimation period for firm i. 
 
5.2 Nonparametric tests 
Contrary to parametric tests which rest on the assumption that abnormal returns 
are normally distributed, nonparametric tests are free of specific assumptions 
concerning the distribution of returns. Nonparametric tests (e.g. the sign test) are 
often used to check the robustness of the results obtained from parametric tests. 
However, Campbell and Wasley (1993) find that Corrado’s (1989) rank test 
performs better when using daily return observations. The test formulated by 
Corrado is also less affected by an event-date excess-returns variance increase 
compared to parametric tests (see also Subramaniam (199)).  The test statistic for 
the null hypothesis of no abnormal return on a certain event day is:  
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Let Kiτ be the rank of the abnormal return for security i for event time period τ 
where we use that the expected rank under the null hypothesis equals (Li +1/2) 
and the denominator equals: 
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5.3 Variance tests 
Besides just looking at the abnormal returns around investor meetings, this 
article also conducts a simple variance test based on Bartlett’s test for 
homogeneity of variance. The idea is that if management does not reveal any 
information before or at an investor meeting, the cross-sectional variances of the 
daily abnormal returns should not change significantly i.e. cross-sectional 
variances of abnormal return should be constant over time.  
If all the variances over the entire event period are not significantly different then 
this is a strong indication that information relevant to share prices has not been 
revealed. However, if the variances of the abnormal returns are significantly 
different from each other in an interval around the investor meeting, but are not 
significantly different in the interval consisting of the complementary interval, 
this indicates that relevant information is revealed by management. The 
complementary interval is the set consisting of; {-12, λ } ∪ {λ,+12}, where λ is 
some constant ∈ {-12,12}. By varying λ we may find at what time management 
could have revealed  relevant information. The test is based on the following 
expression: 
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where 2fσ  is the average variance over the considered period of time. f is the 
number of degrees of freedom which equals 119 and k is the number of observed 
variances in the considered period (max 25). I do not attempt to construct any 
model for the variance in the event period or calculate an expression for 
“abnormal” variance. This is due to the uncertainty about what the true model is, 
i.e. the functional form of the variance (see e.g. Bentzen and Sellin (1999)). 
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6. Results 
Figure 1 shows the cumulative average abnormal returns for investor 
meetings/presentations. It is interesting to notice that management is unable to 
“speak up the price” since the cumulative average abnormal returns over the 
entire event period is close to zero. This suggests that it is generally not possible 
for investors to earn abnormal returns just by buying 12 days prior to investor 
meetings and holding the shares 12 days afterwards. However, this does not 
necessarily imply that professional investors and analysts should refrain from 
going to investor meetings, only that it is impossible to earn abnormal returns in 
the long run. Professional analysts may get relevant information through investor 
meetings just by observing the behavior of management and by inferring, not only 
what management actually says, but also from what it does not say.  
 
From the perspective of the individual analysts, it may be vital that she gets first 
hand information, instead of solely relying on second hand information  
sources. The cumulative average abnormal returns prior to investor meetings are 
all negative (except  for day –12), but figure 2 shows that they start to increase 
five days prior to an investor meeting  and continue to last to four days after an 
investor meeting, and afterwards they slowly decline.   
Figure 1: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns for 
investor meetings/presentations in %
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This indicates that the relevant information is revealed around investor meetings, 
although in order to formulate more accurate statements, it is necessary to divide 
the entire event period into sub-periods.  
 
     Table 1. Null Hypothesis of CAAR 
         Interval               CAAR               Z-test 
      -12 ; +12              -0,207             -0,177 
      -12 ;  -6               -0,448              -0,612 
         -5 ;  -1                 0,839              1,076 
         -2 ;  +2                0,625              1,567 
          0 ;  +4                0,814              2,077 
        +5 : +12              -0,892             -1,243 
 
 
Table 1 reports the results of the null hypothesis of CAAR in different sub-
periods. CAAR is positive around investor meetings and significantly different 
from zero in the interval from day zero to day +4, which suggest that relevant 
information is revealed by management at investor meetings. Even though CAAR 
is less than one percent, investors can earn an abnormal return using a simple 
trading strategy, where they buy shares at the day investor meetings take place 
and sell the same shares four days later. 
Table 2 shows the results of Corrado’s (1989) rank test which more robustly 
enables us to evaluate the significance of a particular day’s abnormal return in 
the event period. In addition, table 2 reports each day’s rank deviation from the 
expected rank. The only day that abnormal returns are significantly in the event 
period, is one day prior to an investor meeting (t-value of 2.114). The  deviation 
from the expected rank is 1.45, meaning that the average rank is positive and 
exceeds the expected rank on that day. The deviation from the expected rank (the 
mean) is also positive and relatively large at day zero, although it is not 
significantly different from zero (t-value of 1.811).  
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Table 2 further shows that the rank values’ deviation from the mean is positive 
just around investor meetings, where as they become negative, when moving 
away from day zero. It therefore indicates that management reveals relevant 
information around investor meetings, enabling investors to earn abnormal 
returns.   
 
Table 2. Results of Nonparametric Tests 
  Day   Z-statistic Average rank deviationa Day  Z-statistic Average rank deviationa  
  -12        0,522             0,358                      1       1,203                0,825 
  -11       -0,789           -0,542                      2        0,036                0,025 
  -10       -0,959           -0,658                      3        0,923                0,633 
  -9          0,036            0,025                       4        0,182                0,125 
  -8         -0,122           -0,083                      5       -1,458               -1,000 
  -7         -0,583           -0,400                      6       -0,388               -0,267 
  -6         -1,491           -0,708                      7       -0,352               -0,242 
  -5          0,777            0,533                      8        -0,400              -0,275 
  -4          0,048            0,033                      9        -1,385              -0,950 
  -3         -0,121           -0,083                    10       -0,462               -0,312 
  -2          0,826            0,566                     11       -0,572              -0,392 
  -1          2,114*           1,450                     12       -0,462              -0,312 
   0          1,811            1,242 
+The expected deviation from the mean rank i.e. ( )∑
=
−
N
i
iKN 1
131 τ  
 
Turning to the analysis of variances, figure 2 displays the variances of the 
abnormal returns over the entire event period, showing a clear pattern. Changes 
in variances tend to increase the closer we get to investor meetings, indicating 
that relevant information is revealed by management around investor meetings. 
The highest variance is reached the day investor meetings take place, whereas the 
longer we get from day zero, the more stabile are the variances. The variances 
just around day zero are almost five times larger compared to the “normal” 
variances in the two “tails”.  
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This also indicates that information is revealed just a few days around investor 
meetings, thereby supporting the findings of the previous tests. Table 2 shows the 
results of the variances tests. 
 
    Table 3.  Bartlett’s test for homogeneity of variance  
            Interval             Average Variance   Test statistic    χ2 (95% fractile) 
    [-12,-9] ∪ [+9,+12]        0,00033                 5,74                14,06 
     [-12,-5] ∪ [+5,+12]          0,00036                28,74               24,99 
     [-12,+12]                         0,00049              128,19               36,41 
 
Bartlett’ test for homogeneity of variance shows that the only interval wherein the 
variances are not significantly different consists of the interval [-12,-9] ∪ 
[+9,+12]. This enhances the statement above in which information is revealed 
just a few days around investor meetings. Table 2 also shows that the average 
variance differs considerably in the three intervals. It gives an indication that 
relevant information has been revealed just a few days around an investor 
meeting. The correlation matrix of abnormal returns (not reported in the article) 
does not show a high correlation among the abnormal returns over the period.  
Figur 3. Variances of Abnormal Returns
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The results depicted in table 2 must be seen in connection with the analysis of 
abnormal returns, where the analysis of variance supports the previous findings 
concerning abnormal returns. Thus,  since none of the firms in the sample have 
informed Copenhagen Stock Exchange about any information that could 
influence share prices around investor meetings, this may provide some kind of 
evidence that inside information has been revealed. 
This impression is strengthen when we look at how investor meetings affect share 
price turnover. Figure 4 shows the normalized turnover in the event period. 
Maximum turnover is reached the day after investor meetings take place, followed 
by day two with the second highest turnover. None of the other days in the event 
period seem to exhibit any extraordinary turnover, suggesting that investor 
meetings boost turnover and enhance liquidity.  
The normalization is obtained by first dividing each firms daily share price turnover in the event 
period with the firms average share price turnover over the entire event period. Thereafter is the 
cross-sectional average turnover calculated for each day in the event period. 
 
One explanation for the increased share price turnover immediately after investor 
meetings could be that management provides participants at the meeting with 
relevant new information. This new information creates incentives for  
participants to trade the firms shares, trading that otherwise would not had 
occurred.  
Figure 4. Normalized Share Price Turnover
0
0,5
1
1,5
2
-12 -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12
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7.  Robustness 
A full assessment of the potential causes for share price reactions requires that 
the analysis controls for firm-specific characteristics. Table 4 displays the results 
from a cross-sectional regression model with the cumulative average abnormal 
return as the dependent variable. The explanatory variables are factors that may 
influence firm performance such as; volatility, leverage, book/market, size (see 
Fama and French (1992), and Dimson and Marsh (1985) regarding the size 
effect), and finally ownership by large shareholders (see e.g.  Shleifer and Vishny 
(1986)). None of the explanatory variables have a significant influence on the 
vector of abnormal returns, suggesting that the abnormal returns are 
independent of these firm specific characteristics. This is also the case if the 
dependent variable, defined as the average abnormal return on day t=-1 is 
regressed against the above explanatory variables (although the results are not 
displayed in the article). 
Danish firms normally announce that management intends to arrange an 
investor meeting several weeks before the investor meeting takes place. It is 
natural to ask whether such an announcement could contain a relevant signal 
thereby changing the expectations of the market participants. For example, it 
could be the case that a firm only holds an investor meeting when it has good 
news. However, a separate event study, in which the event is defined as the 
announcement of a forthcoming investor meeting, does not show any significant 
impact on share prices.  
A possible explanation is that investor meetings are conducted on a regular basis 
which usually is the case when investor meetings are carried out through the 
Danish Society of Financial Analysts. Investor meetings may also differ in nature 
and subject, making the signal of such an announcement less powerful.  
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Table 4.   Cross-sectional Regression on Firms’ Characteristics 
OLS regressions estimates with CAAR(0:4) as the dependent variable with 
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors (see White (1980)). The numbers in 
the parentheses are t-statistics. 
 
Explanatory variables: 
Volatility:     The volatility of stock return in estimation period.  
Size:        The natural log of market value measured as average outstanding 
shares times market price. 
Book/Market: The natural log of book equity minus natural log of market equity. 
Owner:          Cumulative ownership of blockholders holding more than 5 percent. 
Leverage:       Book value of debt divided by book value of equity. 
 
  Independent variables:            1.            2.           3.           4.            5. 
 
  Constant                             -0,026     -0,035     -0,021     -0,011    -0,007 
                                           (-0,690)   (-1,086)   (-1,754)   (-1,091)   (-0,735) 
 
  Volatility                              0,247     0,245      0,239       0,246     0,275 
                                            (1,679)    (1,690)    (1,639)     (1,708)   (1,865) 
 
  Book/market                      -0,005     -0,005      -0,007     -0,007 
                                           (-0,595)   (-0,658)    (-1,028)   (-0,970) 
 
  Leverage                             0,007       0,007      0,067  
                                           (1,009)     (1,011)     (0,954) 
 
  Size                                    0,002       0,002 
                                           (0,422)     (0,482) 
 
  Owner                               -0,002 
                                          (-0,573) 
 
 
  Adj. R2                               0,077       0,075       0,074       0,068    0,062 
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8.  Discussion of results 
The results, in particular of the analysis of variances, suggest that management 
reveals information to some market participants, enabling them to earn abnormal 
returns. Management thereby violates its fiduciary duty as well as the regulation 
codified in the Danish securities legislation. The crucial question is whether the 
obtained results are due to the inefficiency of the Danish Stock Exchange, or can 
be generalized to other EU countries. Recent empirical studies shows that the 
Copenhagen Stock Exchange is quite efficient since share prices react rapidly to 
earnings announcements (see Thinggaard et al (1999)).  
It seems that there may be a need for a more detailed and specific regulation 
concerning management’s holdings of investor meetings/presentations. This has 
also just recently been recognized by the SEC which has implemented a much 
richer and elaborated legislation dealing with  management’s communication with 
investors. The equal treatment of shareholders with respect to information 
supplied by listed firms plays a crucial role in the legal protection of investors. 
This aspect is also very important in corporate governance, since a higher degree 
of investor protection reduces agency costs due to the inherent asymmetries in 
information between shareholders and management.  
Capital markets cannot be viewed independently of legal rules, sine they to a very 
large extent determine the efficiency of capital markets. The relationship between 
legislation and the supply of external finance play a key role since countries with 
poor investment protection also have less developed capital markets (see La Porta, 
Lopez-De-Silances and Schleifer (1997)). The legal protection of shareholders is 
not only limited to  securities regulation, but also to other areas of business law, 
especially company law, which to some degree supplement securities regulation. 
In particular, this is the case for duty of loyalty that loosely said implies that 
managers have a duty to act in shareholders’ interests.  
There is no doubt that investor meetings are valuable and increases 
managements credibility. This is also documented by an interview survey 
covering major public companies in the US (see Baretta (1990)).  
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IR professionals believe that “the credibility factor is key to reducing investor 
perception of risk in the company as an investment, gaining investor confidence 
and maintaining  a stock price that reflects the company’s past performance and 
future potential” (c.f. page 28).  Arranging investor meetings is an important part 
of a listed company’s corporate communication strategy. At the same time it 
contributes to enhancing the efficiency of stock markets, provided that 
management treats all investors equally. However, the question is whether the 
present EU-based securities regulation is adequate or instead needs to be 
supplemented by specific guidelines regarding listed firms’ arrangements of 
investor meetings. The EU-commission could for example formulate rules that 
require the use of simultaneous video presentations available on the internet or 
which prohibit that journalists are excluded from any investor meeting. However, 
it is important that the provisions of sanctions in such rules are formulated much 
more in accordance with the US-regulation. Since if this is not the case, the rules 
may only stand as an empty threat, because the punishment for violating the 
rules cannot be compared to the financial gain obtained by violating these rules.  
 
9.  Conclusion  
Investor meetings play a vital role in management’s communications with actual 
and potential shareholders. However, management has to be aware of the 
provisions set fourth in the securities regulation, concerning the general duty to 
disclose relevant information and the prohibition against insider trading. Based 
on a sample of 120 investor meetings/presentations held by Danish listed firms, 
the article demonstrates that the current securities regulation initialed by the EU, 
is insufficient in securing efficient stock markets. Using both traditional event 
study analysis as well as an analysis of variances, I show that investor meetings 
convey relevant information and enable investors to earn abnormal return around 
investor meetings. Compared to European insider trading regulation, US 
regulation deals more directly with the problems of insider trading and the duty 
to disclose relevant information to all investors simultaneously. 
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Appendix: 
 
Appendix A: Correlation Matrix 
 
Appendix B: Average Abnormal Returns 
 
 
 
 
 
CAAR (0,4) Volatility Size Book/Market Owner Debt/equity
CAAR (0,4) 1,00
Volatility 0,23 1,00
Size 0,07 0,06 1,00
Book/Market -0,14 -0,30 -0,51 1,00
Owner -0,06 -0,01 -0,21 0,22 1,00
Debt/equity 0,09 0,06 -0,16 0,02 0,02 1,00
Event Time Average Abnormal Returns
-12 0,066
-11 -0,403
-10 -0,112
-9 0,069
-8 -0,062
-7 -0,083
-6 -0,448
-5 0,269
-4 0,160
-3 0,043
-2 0,029
-1 0,337
0 0,130
1 -0,055
2 0,183
3 0,314
4 0,247
5 -0,203
6 -0,091
7 0,000
8 -0,202
9 -0,041
10 -0,133
11 0,001
12 -0,224
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